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INTRODUCTION
In Moscow, Russia, the Swedish furniture retailer IKEA was asked to pay a bribe only weeks before the opening of its flagship store in 2000. Refusal to pay would lead to electricity being shut down. IKEA responded, not by paying the bribe, but by renting diesel generators large enough to power the entire shopping mall. It was later revealed that the Russian executive hired to manage the diesel generators took kickbacks from the rental company to inflate the price. IKEA's expansion in Russia was halted, and two years later senior executives were dismissed for allowing bribes.
The story about IKEA in Russia, told by among many others The New York Times 1 ,
illustrates important aspects of globalization. Trade and foreign direct investments can potentially improve economic development, benefitting both consumers and capital owners.
At the same time, dysfunctional institutions, such as corruption, may thwart these potential benefits. The establishment of and actions taken by firms operating in foreign countries may also affect norms and behavior. On the one hand, IKEA's refusal to pay bribes may facilitate the fight against corruption in Russia. On the other hand, the profits generated by IKEA increase the potential gains from engaging in corrupt behavior. It is therefore not clear how the degree of corruption in Russia would change as a result of IKEA's ventures. More generally, little is known about the effects of globalization on institutional quality. This paper aims to shed light on this particular question: Is increasing globalization on average followed by improving or deteriorating institutional quality?
Changing institutions will generally involve trade-offs between short-and long run benefits.
Consequently, the time horizon and expectations of those who influence institutions -the institutional entrepreneurs -will be crucial in determining the effects of increased globalization. As the time horizon often is determined by the level of economic development where the institutional entrepreneur is active, it is important to shed light on whether the globalization effect on institutional quality varies across levels of development.
Using the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) to capture several aspects of institutional quality and the KOF Globalization Index to measure economic and social globalization, we construct a panel data set covering over 101 countries from 1992 to 2010, and regress several measures of institutional quality (averaged over four years) on lagged indicators of globalization. As suggested by the findings in Haggard and Tiede (2011) , we examine different types of institutional quality separately, and we avoid what Blonigen and Wang (2005) call 'inappropriate pooling of wealthy and poor countries' by using both sample splits and interaction effects. In line with our theoretical predictions, results reveal that globalization is typically followed by improved institutional quality in rich countries, but in poor countries this relationship is the opposite. Despite institutions changing slowly over time, many correlations are statistically significant and the difference between rich and poor countries is highly robust.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses theoretically how globalization and economic openness is expected to affect institutions and reviews recent research. Section 3 discusses the measurement of institutions and presents the data, while Section 4 contains the empirical analysis, including several robustness checks and tests the relationship between globalization and institutional quality across levels of development. Section 5 concludes the paper by summarizing our results and discusses how to interpret the findings.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (a) Theoretical expectations
North (1990) defined institutions as "rules of the game" that shape human interaction (p. 3) and argued that "third world countries are poor because the institutional constraints define a set of payoffs to political/economic activity that does not encourage productive activity" (p.
110). A large following literature has empirically confirmed the quality of institutions as an important determinant of economic growth: Knack and Keefer (1995) , Rodrik et al. (2004) , Abdiweli (2003) and Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006) to mention just a few. 2 There is no
complete agreement on what institutions matter the most, though the survey by Durlauf et al. (2005) points to low corruption, political stability, property rights and rule of law all being important for development. The importance of low corruption for growth is also confirmed by Haggard and Tiede (2011) .
As the evidence of the importance of institutional quality accumulates, it is natural to examine if and how institutions change. Institutions shape human interaction, but at the same time institutions are enforced and upheld by human interaction. According to North (1981) , institutional change is incremental and occurs when influential agents perceive they could do better by altering the existing institutional framework. Li et al. (2005) Other mechanisms are more neutral. For example, globalization is likely to change the distribution of power within countries through, for example, the transmission of technology (Romer, 1990) . In this case, globalization leads to changes in the distribution of the ability to influence a country's institutions. Along these lines, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) For this reason, the time horizon and expectations of those who influence institutions will be crucial in determining the effects of increased globalization. Referring again to the case of IKEA in Russia, it may be the case that those who engage in corrupt activity realize that corruption is likely to diminish the long run benefits from having IKEA expanding in Russia, but when future benefits are heavily discounted, the short run benefits of increased corruption are higher. In the latter case, the presence of IKEA creates an incentive for elites to alter institutions so as to easier reap short run benefits from corruption, property rights violations and similar activities. If, however, more weight is put on long run economic development, the effect of IKEA would be to increase the return to institutional improvements.
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In poor countries, uncertainty and instability is typically higher, and life expectancy is shorter.
Consequently, the incentives to improve institutions to foster long run economic development are lower, and the incentives to worsen institutions (through, for example, accepting corruption) are higher (see Acemoglu and Verdier,2000; Fjeldstad and Tungodden, 2003; and Altindag and Xu, 2009 ) for further discussions). Thus, the correlation between globalization and subsequent improvements in institutional quality when examined using panel data with country fixed effects is expected to be smaller (and possibly negative) in poor countries than in rich countries.
(b) Previous literature
In the wake of increasing globalization, several studies have examined whether factors such as trade and economic openness affect institutions, especially rule of law and the level of corruption. But no study has noted that the effect of globalization on institutions is likely to depend on the level of development as suggested by the time horizon argument given above.
As a result, existing research potentially suffers from inappropriate pooling of low-income and high-income countries (Blonigen and Wang, 2005) . Table 1 summarizes six recent papers that examine an effect of economic openness on institutional characteristics. Several caveats however apply in the existing literature. Only two studies so far use panel data. Cross-sectional studies rely on variation between countries to estimate an effect of openness on institutional quality, restricting our knowledge with respect to the causality of the relationships. While some plausible time-invariant instruments for economic openness have been used, effects in cross-sectional studies are not identified using within-country variation.
For example, Levchenko (2011) shows that countries whose geographical characteristics predispose them to export in so called institutionally intensive sectors have higher institutional quality. Importantly, this finding does not imply that an increase in trade flows is followed by institutional improvement.
The two existing panel data studies arrive at different results. Bhattacharyya (2012) finds that the longer a country has been open according to the Sachs and Warner index updated by Wacziarg and Welch (2003) , the better protected are private property rights as measured by expropriation risk and repudiation of contracts in the International Country Risk Guide.
Conversely, using yearly bilateral trade flow data and the Freedom House index for political rights and civil liberties, Nicolini and Paccagnini (2011) do not find any causality from trade to institutions, nor vice versa. Given that institutions change slowly over time, the result may however be driven by their use of yearly data.
Finally, the literature on globalization and institutional quality has so far employed strict economic measures of globalization, such as trade flows or the Sachs Warner index that classifies a country as either open or not. The process of globalization, however, is a broad and multidimensional phenomenon with economic, social and political components (Arribas et al., 2009; Dreher et al., 2008 ) that may affect institutions differently, suggesting that a strict focus on economic measures might limit our understanding of the relationship between globalization and institutional change.
DATA AND METHODS

(a) Data -Institutional quality and globalization
Choosing a measure of institutional quality involves several tradeoffs. For some particular institutions, such as democracy, data are available for all major states since 1800 in the Polity IV Project. Other institutional measures are more comprehensive, but cover much fewer countries and years. 6 Our choice is the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2010) . This dataset captures several aspects of institutional quality, begins in 1996 and covers 193 countries by 2010, and has not been used before in this line of research. Inference using year to year changes is not advised, but averaging over short time periods yields a reasonably comprehensive measure of various aspects of institutional quality for both high-income and low-income countries.
For interpretation, it is important to know that the WGI compile and summarize information from several sources, including both expert assessments such as the CPIA assessments (used by Chauvet and Collier 2008) and public surveys (such as the Afrobarometer surveys). Each source is assigned to one of six aggregate indicators, which are averaged and made comparable across countries using an unobserved components model. The crucial assumption in this procedure is that the observed data from each source are a linear function of the underlying, unobserved level of governance. 7 The six aggregate indicators are government
effectiveness (GE), control of corruption (CC), regulatory quality (RQ), political stability (PS), rule of law (RL), and voice and accountability (VA).
Previous studies such as Knack and Keefer (1995) and Al-Marhubi (2005) use the average of these indicators. The findings in Haggard and Tiede (2011) , however, suggest that developing countries vary in the way different types of institutional quality are combined. Specifically, they note that a large cluster of developing countries combines high corruption levels with relatively well functioning property rights, whereas a second smaller cluster is worse in both dimensions and also very violent. We therefore use these six indicators separately instead of averaging them. Details of the six measures are presented in the appendix.
To measure globalization, we use the log of the KOF index (Dreher et al., 2008) Variation is however large among observations and differentiating between rich and poor countries allows us to see a somewhat stronger correlation seeming to exist in high-income contexts. Furthermore, figure 1 reveals that there are no obvious outliers in the sample. (2000) and Fisman and Gatti (2002) suggest that country size has the opposite effect, presumably due to the difficulties in sharing of power and responsibilities between central and local authorities. Rent from natural resources is included to measure natural resources abundance, found associated with higher levels of corruption by both Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Treisman (2000) , and also with lower quality of government in general by Anthonsen et al. (2012) .
Additional controls are used as robustness checks, including the log of total net development assistance and aid from the WDI, the percentage of adult population (age > 15) with completed secondary education (Barro and Lee, 2010) , and the Polity IV index ranking a country's political institutions by giving each country a score from -10 to 10, ranging from pure autocracy to consolidated democracy (Marshall and Jaggers, 2012) . 
(c) Method
To examine the relationships between globalization and institutional quality, we specify the following equation
where IQ stands for institutional quality, G is globalization, X refers to a set of controls, and u it is the error term. To account for unobservable heterogeneity potentially correlated with the explanatory variables, we include country fixed effects but we also run a random effects model as a robustness check.
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The model is estimated using four year averages over five periods : 1992-1995, 1996-1999, 2000-2003, 2004-2007, and 2008-2010 . Averages are used to minimize the effects of noise and single year fluctuations in the data. To mitigate potential endogeneity, independent variables are lagged, so that average globalization from 1992-1995 is used to explain institutional quality over 1996-1999. The only variable that is used with its actual values is a share of population with secondary education, as this data only covers the years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010 . To enhance comparability across different specifications, we don't allow the sample to vary across the models of the same specification, thus, the effective sample is limited by data availability. To allow for different effects in developed and developing countries, we divide the full sample into sub-samples of high-income and lowincome countries (with the threshold at GDP per capita of 4000 USD).
RESULTS
(a) Main results
Tables 3 and 4 present fixed effects estimation results for the relationship between economic and social globalization and the six dimensions of institutional quality, using the full sample.
Economic globalization seems to be followed by improving institutions, with four of the six dimensions reaching statistical significance at least at the ten percent level. In contrast, the estimates for social globalization are small and never significant. The control variables generally have the expected sign, with population size and rents from natural resources being negatively related to institutional quality. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Running separate regressions for low-income and high-income countries drastically changes the results, in line with our theoretical expectations. In particular the positive relationship between economic globalization and institutional quality in the baseline analysis seems to be fully driven by the relationship in richer countries. Similarly, social globalization improves institutional quality in high-income countries during the time period studied. On the other hand, economic globalization is not correlated with institutional quality in the less developed context, and social globalization is negative and significant for four out of six institutional measures.
To gain deeper knowledge on what factors in the globalization process affect institutional quality, we further disaggregate the economic and social globalization measures. Tables 5 and table 6 present the effects of five types of globalization on the six dimensions of institutional quality for low-income and high-income countries separately.
The results reveal some patterns that are not visible in the pooled sample:
• Economic flows correlate with worsened institutions in low-income countries, with significant effects for government effectiveness and control of corruption. For rich countries, the sign is the opposite for all dimensions, and significantly so for government effectiveness, control of corruption and political stability.
• The personal contacts as a part of social globalization correlate negatively with institutional quality in low-income countries, but not in high-income countries.
• Both cultural proximity and information flows are followed by institutional improvements, often with significant effects, in high-income countries but not in lowincome countries.
• More liberal trade policies (as measured by the economic restrictions dimension of the KOF index) correlate with better institutions in low-income countries, but not so in high-income countries. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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In short, only liberalization of economic restrictions seem to do more good to institutions in low-income countries than in high-income countries. The other four aspects of globalization all capture some kind of human interaction such as trade, foreign investment, tourism, cultural integration and surfing the Internet. To the extent that increases in these activities affects institutions, it leads to improvements in high-income countries and to worse institutions in low-income countries. This is very much in line with our theoretical prior arguments and suggests that the results in previous studies using samples including rich and poor countries together should be interpreted with care.
(b) Robustness tests
To verify the robustness of our results, we include a number of additional control variables used in the empirical literature on institutional change: Political regime, represented by the Polity IV score, the share of adult population (age > 15) with completed secondary education and total net development assistance and aid.
The main difference between rich and poor countries remains when including these variables.
As expected, Polity IV score is not significant given that it changes little over time. Education has a significant negative effect on political stability but is otherwise not significant. Most interestingly, aid is typically positive and significant, suggesting either that aid improves institutional quality or that more aid is given to countries where institutions are improving. 9 Previous findings have associated aid with a decline in institutional quality (Brautigam and Knack, 2004) or found it having only a small impact on institutional change (Knack 2004) . However, according to Wright (2009) , there are factors that might intervene in the aid-institutions relationship, causing aid to improve a country's accountability.
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In the main analysis, the strategy to identify differences between rich and poor countries is to divide the full sample. A different strategy is to include an interaction term between globalization and GDP. Doing so improves the power of the estimations and allows us to calculate the marginal effect of globalization on institutional quality at different levels of GDP per capita. In poor countries political power is often concentrated to an economic elite, for example the major producers and investors in the economy. Such organization calls for little institutional change to occur as influential agents have little incentives to e.g. improve property rights for the wider economy or reduce corruption by altering the existing framework. As long as the group who live off the fruits from globalization enjoy privileged access to a superior level of standard of living compared to the benefits that they would be able to have in case institutional quality improved, little change will take place. As discussed by Acemoglu (2008) the economic elite protect their property rights and ensure that they do not fear expropriation, (b) The capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies:
3. Government Effectiveness (GE) -capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
6. Control of Corruption (CC) -capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 
